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Abstract
In this article we revisit a number of disputes regarding significance
logics—i.e., inferential frameworks capable of handling meaningless, al-
though grammatical, sentences—that took place in a series of articles
most of which appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy be-
tween 1966 and 1978. These debates concern (i) the way in which logical
consequence ought to be approached in the context of a significance logic,
and (ii) the way in which the logical vocabulary has to be modified (either
by restricting some notions, or by adding some vocabulary) to keep as
much of Classical Logic as possible. Our aim is to show that the divisions
arising from these disputes can be dissolved in the context of a novel and
intuitive proposal that we put forward.
1 Introduction
From 1966 to 1978, a group of philosophers among which were Leonard God-
dard, Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan), Karel Lambert, Richard Haack,
Ross Brady and Michael Bradley took part on a series of debates—incarnated
in a number of articles most of which appeared in the Australasian Journal of
Philosophy—concerning the legitimacy, the definition, and the appropriate re-
sources needed to build significance logics. Systems of this kind are intended
to be inferential frameworks that allows to handle meaningless, although gram-
matical, sentences. Items of this sort were taken by some of these philosophers
to express neither a truth nor a falsehood, that is, they were taken as sentences
completely lacking a truth-value—i.e., as a kind of truth-value gaps.
Motivation to admit sentences of this sort allegedly came from various cor-
ners of the philosophical landscape. Some thought that Russell’s type theory
rendered sentences violating its construction rules as meaningless, and so be-
lieved, too, those who were focused on category mistakes in the context of Ryle’s
philosophy of language. Others claimed that semantic paradoxes and the para-
doxes of vagueness represented genuine cases of nonsignificance, independently
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of being counted as type or category mistakes by some plausible account. Ad-
ditionally, there were those who thought that unverifiable sentences, classified
as such by the work of the logical positivists, were deprived of meaning in this
very same way.
Convinced of the fruitfulness of constructing a system allowing for reasoning
with both meaningful and meaningless sentences—i.e. of building a significance
logic—some of these scholars faced the task of designing proper technical means
to formalize their ideas. In what pertains to the semantics of their target sys-
tems, this required not only making precise the way in which the usual logical
connectives were supposed to work when meaningless sentences were around,
but also choosing an appropriate notion of logical consequence for the resulting
formalism. Both of these tasks were (knowingly or not) carried out against the
backdrop of the work by Dmitri Bochvar and Sören Halldén on the so-called
logics of nonsense.
The work done by this pair of philosophers embodies two of the main alter-
natives used to define logical consequence when working with many-valued non-
classical systems. That is, siding either with truth-preservation from premises to
conclusion (i.e., Bochvar’s choice) or with non-falsity-preservation from premises
to conclusion (i.e., Halldén’s option). As is well-known, these two accounts need
not coincide in non-classical environments—especially when truth-value gaps are
admitted—and, for this very reason, they do not produce the same result for
significance logics. Early in the discussion it was noticed that both alternatives
had substantially undesirable consequences. Particularly, while Bochvar’s alter-
native implied the lack of those tautologies present in Classical Logic, Halldén’s
option implied the invalidity of some inferences very dear to Classical Logic.
One way in which the participants of this discussion settled these differences—
between those formulae they wished were logical truths and those which actually
were logical truths in their systems, and between those inferences they wished
were valid and those which were actually valid in their systems—was through
the introduction of certain subtleties concerning the logical vocabulary. Indeed,
when working with significance logics it became fairly common to distinguish an
internal and an external vocabulary allowing, e.g., for two ways to negate a for-
mula ϕ, as well as two ways to conjoin and disjoin formulae. For instance, while
for some of these scholars saying “not ϕ” of a meaningless sentence resulted in
an equally nonsignificant sentence, it so happened that saying “it is not true
that ϕ” (thereby claiming that ϕ was non-truth-apt) resulted in a true sentence,
nevertheless. Thus, the division between internal and external language allowed
logicians to keep all the crown jewels. Although there were certain logical truths
that were absent and certain valid inferences that were not properly ruled so,
their thought was that inasmuch as the attention was restricted to formulae
constructed with the appropriate vocabulary, these problems faded away.
In this article, we would like to show that these divisions (truth-preservation
versus non-falsity-preservation, internal versus external vocabulary) are unnec-
essary. That in order to have a significance logic complying with the intuitive
desiderata, enjoying all the advantages that we want from it and suffering none
of the disadvantages we want to avoid, there is no need to opt for any of these
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dichotomous options. We will argue that there are alternative and more fruitful
definitions of logical consequence that even in the context of significance log-
ics render a system which has all the logical truths and the valid inferences of
Classical Logic. We will claim, additionally, that we are not forced to choose be-
tween truth- or non-falsity-preservation, and that it is not mandatory to choose
between expressing the key notions represented by the logical connectives in
either an internal or an external language. The former, because both notions
are going to be represented within our system in a qualified sense; the latter,
because those inferences valid in our resulting system will be the same no matter
which of these languages we employ.
For these purposes, this article is structured as follows. In Section 1, we
discuss the reasons presented by the advocates of significance logics to endow
these systems with some peculiar three-valued semantics. In Section 2, we re-
view the main alternatives employed to understand logical consequence in the
context of significance logics, paying special attention to each alternative’s ad-
vantages and disadvantages. In Section 3, we revisit the strategy of appealing to
various divisions and restrictions of the logical vocabulary in order to overcome
the shortcomings of understanding validity either as truth-preservation or as
non-falsity-preservation. Section 4 is where we build our own positive proposal.
First, we prove that there is a perfectly cogent formal way of understanding log-
ical consequence in significance logics that renders Classical Logic in all relevant
respects, and which does not fall into the dichotomous alternatives discussed so
far. Secondly, we show that adopting our system allows for the dissolution of
the truth versus non-falsity divide, since both options are represented within
our definition of logical consequence—in a sense that we will opportunely pre-
cise. Thirdly, we show that embracing this novel option makes the division of
internal and external languages unnecessary, therefore dissolving the need for
such a distinction. Finally, Section 5 outlines some concluding remarks.
2 Need for nonsense
The debate that took place in the articles to which we previously referred,
concerning the legitimacy of working with significance logics, had two main
opposing parties. On one side were those (Goddard, Routley, Brady) supporting
the legitimacy of such an enterprise, believing there were enough reasons to
develop a non-classical framework in which meaningless—and, thus, non-truth-
valued—sentences could be hosted. On the other side were those (Lambert,
Haack, Bradley) who did not share that view, either because they thought
that meaningless sentences should remain outside of the dominions of logic, or
because they thought that meaningless sentences could be somehow treated as
truth-valued.
The former claimed the need for nonsense was justified in a number of dif-
ferent theories in philosophy of mathematics, logic, philosophy of language, and
philosophy of science that had an implicit or explicit criterion of significance ren-
dering intuitively grammatical but meaningless indicative sentences as rightfully
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existent. Russell’s type theory was one of the places were most of these schol-
ars found motivation to entertain nonsignificant sentences, as was also Ryle’s
philosophy of language—especially his considerations on category mistakes. An
acknowledgment of these sources of inspiration, together with an assessment of
the different ways in which they treated nonsense can be seen, for example, in
the following quote from an article by Goddard:
Thus, expressions such as ‘The rainbow is happy’, ‘Mary kissed my
thoughts’ and ‘Saturdays love Mary’ are absurd for Ryle. They
are absurd because individuals belong not only to different natural
kinds but also to different logical kinds, and the predicates which
are significant over the individuals of one logical kind (or category)
may not be significant over the individuals of another logical kind.
(...) Within Russell’s theory, however, each of these expressions has
to be taken as significant, i.e., as true-or-false. (...) Since, therefore,
all individuals are of the same logical kind (type, or category), it
follows that a predicate which is significant over any one individual
is significant over all (...) There are, besides, other, more puzzling
features of type-theory, since there are statements, such as ‘The class
of men is not a man’, which must be true if the theory is true (...)
but which nevertheless turn out to be meaningless in terms of the
theory. [18, pp. 139-140]
An additional source of inspiration for considering nonsignificance as an
authentic semantic category was the philosophy of the logical positivists—as
claimed, e.g., in [5]. Especially, the idea that empirical verifiability could be
seen as a criterion of significance according to which empirically unverifiable
sentences were, properly speaking, cases of nonsense masquerading as sense.
This applies, according to the aforementioned school of thought, to rather the-
ological sentences like ‘God is in Heaven’, but also to metaphysical sentences
such as ‘The Absolute is eternal’.
In all fairness, that meaningless was a legitimate semantic category was
defended long before arguments along these lines have been written. During the
first half of the twentieth century, Dmitri Bochvar first, and Sören Halldén later
argued that pathological phenomena like Russell’s Paradox, the Liar Paradox,
and the Sorites Paradox were constituted by properly speaking meaningless
sentences, motivating them to develop their own logics of nonsense in [2] and
[25], respectively.
In this respect, there was enough agreement among the philosophers favoring
the significance logics project that the inclusion of meaninglessness, i.e., neither
true nor false, sentences required an appropriate adjustment of the way in which
the semantics for the usual logical connectives work. In other words, once non-
significance was allowed, it remained to be seen how significant and nonsignifi-
cant sentences interacted with each other when coupled through the commonly
employed logical connections—negation, conjunction, disjunction, and so on.
Consensus was reached, in this regard, that a reasonable desiderata for this task
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was what Goddard and Routley came to refer to as the Principle of Component
Homogeneity : the idea that whenever a compound sentence has a meaningless
component, the compound itself is nonsignificant (see [21, pp. 260-261] and
[19]).
The previous philosophical inspirations for allowing meaningless sentences
seemed to agree with this. For example, these scholars tried to sustain the claim
that the logical positivists advocated for something of this sort in ways like the
following, taken from Goddard and Routley’s book:
It seems in any case apparent that the positivists were committed
to the classical significance connectives by their commitment to the
criterion of verification as a criterion of significance (...) Consider,
first, simple indicative sentences without quantifiers, e.g. (1) The
Absolute is green (2) Snow is green. If (1) is not empirically verifi-
able, then (3) The Absolute is not green is not empirically verifiable.
For if it were, we could assess (3) by observation, experiment, etc.,
as true or false. In this case, however, (1) is false or true, as the case
may be, so contradicting the assumption (...) Again, consider the
conjunction (1) and (2). If (1) is not empirically verifiable, neither
is (1) and (2), while if (1) and (2) is not, either (1) is not or (2) is
not. Hence, in general, we may say: P&Q is empirically verifiable
if, and only if, P is empirically verifiable and Q is empirically veri-
fiable. That is, by [adopting empirical verifiability as a criterion of
significance], P&Q is significant if, and only if, P is significant and
Q is significant. And similarly for disjunction. [21, p. 263]
Furthermore, these authors claim, if Russell’s theory of types is properly
understood, then sentences involving type-equivocations such as ‘The class of
all humans is a human’ should be as nonsignificant as ‘The class of all humans
is not a human’. According to them, Russell appears to adhere to the idea
according to which conditional statements of the form ϕ ⊃ ψ are significant if
and only if both ϕ and ψ are significant—as can be seen in his [36, p. 45].1
Thus, accepting the Principle of Component Homogeneity had clear and
crucial effect in formulating proper semantics for negation, conjunction, and
disjunction in the context of significance logics. The idea was for these connec-
tives to retain their usual truth- and falsity-conditions if and only if all their
components were meaningful, i.e., either true or false. Thus, if truth and falsity
are conceived as two distinct truth-values—t and f , respectively—while mean-
inglessness or nonsignificance is taken as a third semantic category—represented
by the value n, below—these ideas render the following operations, represented
by the so-called weak Kleene truth-tables of [26], that is:2
1Notice that if the usual definitions for conjunction and disjunction in terms of negation
and the conditional are employed, it is straightforward to observe the point made by Goddard,
Routley and others that Russell himself embraced the Principle of Component Homogeneity.
2The fact that n, as an algebraic element, behaves according to the Principle of Component
Homogeneity describes it as infectious—using the terminology of, e.g., [32], [13] and [40]. By
these we mean, in a few words, that if a formula ϕ is assigned n, any formula in which ϕ






∧ t n f
t t n f
n n n n
f f n f
∨ t n f
t t n t
n n n n
f t n f
Figure 1: The weak Kleene truth-tables
However, even if this very important clarifications are in place, it takes little
effort to observe that there is still some work to be done if the aim is to build
an actual significance logic. As Brady and Routley have put it:
Hence, to cope with the matter, a non-standard value, non-significance,
should be introduced as part of the semantics of formal systems, and
these systems should be constructed so as to be able to assess the
validity of arguments involving significance or non-significance. [5,
p. 223]
What is still missing, then, is an appropriate account of validity—i.e., a sys-
tematic way of telling good inferences from bad inferences in a context where
reasoning with potentially meaningless sentences is to be carried out. Mak-
ing this call is, in fact, what led to the first division among those working on
significance logics. To discussing it we now turn.
3 Lines in the sand
3.1 The dispute over logical consequence
While discussing significance logics, the focus has been mainly placed on two
well-known alternatives to define logical consequence in the context of many-
valued systems, which we will detail shortly. Incidentally—although this was
only partially acknowledged in the debate—these options embody the alterna-
tives embraced by early works on these issues, due to Bochvar [2] and Halldén
[25].
For what it is worth, most (though not all) of the discussion was carried out
under the implicit assumption that defining validity amounts to choosing which
truth-values are designated, i.e., which truth values should be preserved from
premises to conclusion. This is in line with the analysis of logical systems as
induced by logical matrices, in the sense of pairs 〈A, D〉 of an algebra A and
a set of designated values D, i.e., a distinguished subset of the universe of the
algebra. In this vein, the elements of the algebra in question are usually referred
to as ‘truth-values’, while its operations are commonly represented in the form
of the so-called ‘truth-tables’—just like at the end of §2, above. Thus, given a
propositional language L and a corresponding formula algebra FOR(L) defined
as usual, a valuation v is an homomorphism from FOR(L) to A, where both
algebras are of the same type, and FOR(L) is the universe of FOR(L).
Finally, a logical matrix M = 〈A, D〉 induces a consequence relation M as
follows, where Γ ⊆ FOR(L) and ϕ ∈ FOR(L):
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Γ M ϕ⇐⇒ for every valuation v: if v[Γ] ⊆ D, then v(ϕ) ∈ D
During the past century, the discussion of which is the preferable significance
logic was mostly centred on determining which logical matrix should be chosen
to work with. However, other options not appealing to logical matrices were
discussed, for example by Goddard and Routley, which we will present and
discuss in the next section.3
The first account of logical consequence for significance logics that we will
review is, definitely, the one that appears to have persuaded most of the people
involved in the discussion. It is no other than the most widespread conception
of logical consequence as concerns the contemporary study of Classical (propo-
sitional) Logic—CL, for short. With this we refer to the idea that whenever
the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. In other words, that
truth-preservation is the right choice. Technically speaking, this will amount to
t being the only designated value, because f represents falsity and n represents
meaninglessness, a sort of truth-value gap.
Interestingly, as central and as independently motivated this point of view
might seem, in the course of the works on significance logics that we are an-
alyzing, most of the reasons presented in its favor were rather indirect. Both
Brady and Routley [5, p. 219] and Routley and Goddard [21, p. 273] argued
that just t should be designated. Their argument relies on the assumption that
we ought to be committed to and that we ought to assert those formulae which
are theorems of our logic (that is, those sentences which receive a designated
value in every valuation). Thus, the latter pair says:
It might perhaps seem obvious that t and only t can be adopted
as a designated value. For clearly f cannot be taken as designated
without undermining the whole purpose of the logic since this would
commit us to the adoption of theses which take the value f for some
or all assignments of values to the components [21, p. 273]
Although the quote goes on to extend these considerations to also apply to
the case where the truth-value n is designated, we will postpone the analysis
of this option for now in order to dissect what has been regarded as the key
disadvantage of the truth-preservation alternative. This is no other than the
fact (whose realization is unanimously credited to Presley in the course of these
articles) that if the conception is retained that:
a schema is valid if and only if it comes out true for all interpreta-
tions of its letters (...) some schemata that are valid in the classical
3Additionally, it shall be noted that in the early stages of the discussion revolving around
significance logics the conversation was inclined towards the linguistic notion of implication
rather than the meta-linguistic notion of entailment. This being said, many of the consider-
ations made regarding implications were later exported to the analysis of entailment and its
features—probably because the former was intended to formalize expressions of the form ‘ϕ,
therefore ψ’.
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propositional calculus will be invalid in the three-valued calculus.
[31, pp. 225-234]
Whereas, in the present case, not only some schemata that are valid in Classical
Logic will come out as invalid, but given the Principle of Component Homogene-
ity, all such schemata will come out as invalid. Thus, a significance logic built
along the previous lines whose notion of validity is that of truth-preservation
will have no tautologies—and, therefore, it will not share any of the tautologies
characteristic of Classical Logic.
In order to make this clear, let us look at a significance logic thus defined. We
will start with a propositional language L counting with the usual connectives
¬,∧,∨, and we will consider the algebra WK whose universe is formed by the
set of the three discussed truth-values {t,n, f} and whose operations are just
as described in the weak Kleene truth-tables. Thus, above a valuation from
FOR(L) to WK is a weak Kleene valuation (WK-valuation, hereafter), and
a valuation from FOR(L) to its {t, f}-subalgebra (that is, the two-element
Boolean algebra) is a Boolean valuation.
With these items we can build the matrix 〈WK, {t}〉, having solely t as
its designated value. The logic induced by this matrix is a significance logic
commonly referred to as weak Kleene logic, and usually denoted by Kw3 —see,
e.g., [24]. Historically speaking, it appears accurate to say that Bochvar was the
first to work with this system, as it represents the so-called ‘internal’ fragment
of his significance logic developed in [2]. With regard to Kw3 , it is straightforward
to prove the following as done, for instance, in [2, p. 94] and [21, pp. 273-274].
Observation 1. The logic Kw3 has no tautologies, i.e., there is no ϕ such that
Kw3 ϕ.
The second account of logical consequence for significance logics that we will
review in this section represents, in itself, a way to solve the inconveniences
of the first account. It was mentioned a couple of times, by Goddard, Haack
and Goddard and Routley, but it is really the early work of Halldén [25] which
incarnated this alternative for the first time. It consists in nothing more than
the idea that whenever the premises are not false, the conclusion must also be
not false. Put differently, it amounts to non-falsity-preservation. Technically,
speaking this requires taking not only t as a designated value, but also n as
such.
It is important to highlight that this option was mainly motivated by indirect
reasons. Thus, it is discussed by Haack in [22, p. 76] as a solution to the
conundrum presented by Presley, and indeed as an option which allowed to
regain all the tautologies of Classical Logic. In a similar vein, Goddard says
that “if a formula expresses a logical law, if, and only if, it does not come out
false for any values of the variables (but may be either true or non-significant)
then all the usual laws of [Classical Logic] are ‘laws’ of the three-valued system
so constructed” [19, p. 240]. Halldén himself only devised a logical matrix for
a logic of this sort, because he was puzzled by intuitively incorrect arguments
going from non-false premises to false premises.
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Be that as it may, it is true that a significance logic built along these lines
will help retain the classical tautologies. To make this precise enough, let us
consider again a formal system so defined. We will start with the propositional
language L and we will consider the matrix 〈WK, {t,n}〉, having both t and
n as its designated values, letting WK be the weak Kleene algebra, as before.
The logic induced by this matrix is a significance logic commonly referred to
as Paraconsistent weak Kleene logic, and usually denoted by PWK—see, e.g.,
[3]. Historically speaking, Halldén was the first to work with this system, as it
represents the so-called ‘internal’ fragment of his significance logic developed in
[25]. With regard to PWK, it is straightforward to prove the following as done,
e.g., in [25, pp. 48-49] and [21, p. 300].
Observation 2. The logic PWK has the same tautologies that CL, i.e., PWK ϕ
iff CL ϕ.
This advantage notwithstanding, some scholars pointed out a few problems
with this option.4 On the one hand, Goddard and Routley, and more vocifer-
ously Brady and Routley, underlined the highly unintuitive choice of designat-
ing the meaninglessness value n, given their previously commented adherence
to the idea that we must commit ourselves, and that we ought to assert the sen-
tences which receive a designated value in every valuation—a view referred to
as assertion-designation harmony in [7]. This conception appears to straightfor-
wardly lead to the acceptability of committing ourselves, or of asserting logical
nonsense—see, e.g., [5, p. 219]. Halldén himself appears to have anticipated
such allegations, when he says that:
a formula is to be taken as asserting something only about those
values of which it can meaningfully assert something. The formula
is true if the property or relation it asserts applies to all those values
of which it can be meaningfully asserted. [25, p. 47]
This response is taken by Ferguson [14, p. 67] as a pointer to the fact that
Halldén’s concern is mainly with validity, and not with truth, assertibility or
commitment. This explains why he is not preoccupied with rather ‘local’ prop-
erties, such as the assertibility of individual possibly nonsignificant sentences
one at a time, but with ‘global’ properties like validity instead—looking how to
define logical consequence in general. Whether or not this would be a satisfac-
tory answer to someone sharing the worries of Brady, Goddard and Routley on
designating n, is something we will, nevertheless, not discuss here.
There is a remaining problem associated to this second alternative of taking
logical consequence to be defined by non-falsity-preservation. Namely, that the
Modus Ponens rule is rendered as an invalid inference schema. To see this,
4As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, there might not even be an advantage for
PWK over Kw3 . The reason is that, while the latter does not coincide with CL in what per-
tains to tautologies or theorems, it does nevertheless coincide with CL in what pertains to
anti-theorems—namely, formulae that entail everything. The situation of the former is sym-
metrical, and results of replacing theorems for anti-theorems in the previous sentence. Thus,
both systems lack certain classical inference rules.
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observe that if an implication ϕ ⊃ ψ is defined as a material conditional in the
vein of ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, then if the value of ϕ is n and the value of ψ is f , the inference
going from ϕ and ϕ ⊃ ψ to ψ does not preserve designation in PWK. However,
this is one of the most recognized valid inference rules, and at the same time one
of the least contested.5 Furthermore, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer,
the non-standard features of PWK are not limited to this, as another inference
schema dear to Classical Logic is invalid to it—namely, the principle going from
a conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ to either of the conjuncts ϕ or ψ, sometimes referred to as
Conjunction Simplification.
Therefore, both alternatives (truth-preservation and non-falsity-preservation)
seem to have their own deficiencies. On the one side, we have the lack of clas-
sical tautologies, on the other, the lack of classically valid inferences like Modus
Ponens. Notice moreover that trying to get the best of both approaches by
focusing on the intersection of Kw3 and PWK, that is, by asking both for truth-
and non-falsity-preservation is no good.6 The reason is that the resulting logic
will count as valid only those inferences which are valid according to both con-
ceptions, as it will count as tautologies those that are tautologies according to
both conceptions. Thus, it will not actually enjoy the advantages of both Kw3
and PWK, but instead it will suffer from the disadvantages of both.
It is important to highlight, though, that the discussion around significance
logics reached an insightful conclusion concerning this trouble. Indeed, many
of the philosophers involved independently argued that these difficulties could
be solved by introducing some modifications pertaining to the logical vocab-
ulary. Saliently, Bochvar, Halldén, Goddard and Routley proposed linguistic
workarounds to the previously mentioned shortcomings, in the form of more
logical connectives (intended to express notions that are undefinable in terms
of the basic language) or of distinguished propositional variables, claiming that
those interested in significance logics should actually be looking at restricted
forms of the target inferences and logical truths—where either only these new
connectives, or only these distinguished propositional variables were involved.
In the next section, we discuss these alternatives in full detail.
3.2 The dispute over the logical vocabulary
Goddard and Routley summarize in a rather succinct manner the sources of the
linguistic modifications that were discussed in the works we are commenting
5In fact, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this does not depend on the implication
in question being material implication. Rather, it shall be noted—as done in [3, Theorem 49]—
that the logic PWK is not protoalgebraic, meaning that there is no set of formulae ∆(x, y)
such that PWK ∆(x, x) and x,∆(x, y) PWK y. This means, ultimately, that there is no
term-definable implication-like connective for which Modus Ponens holds in PWK.
6In this vein, the resulting system will stand with regard to Kw3 and PWK in the same
relation that the system RMfde stands with regard to strong Kleene logic K3 and Priest’s
Logic of Paradox LP. Namely, just like RMfde = K3 ∩ LP, the aforementioned system will
represent the intersection of Kw3 and PWK. To the best of our knowledge, such a system was
mentioned in the relevant literature only once as the first-degree entailment fragment of the
logic EM discussed by Francesco Paoli in [28], whence it can be denoted as EMfde. A further
reference about this logic is [1].
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on here. In [21, p. 274], they point out the fact that the technical problems
we reviewed in the previous section (the absence of classical tautologies, or the
failure of Modus Ponens) were due to two assumptions of linguistic provenance
that were taken for granted and that need not be so, if the aim is to construct
a well-functioning and satisfactory significance logic.
The first of these assumptions is that all the logical connectives behave ac-
cording to the Principle of Component Homogeneity, discussed above. The rea-
soning behind the claim that this induces the aforementioned problems goes as
follows. If different connectives, for example different sort of negations, con-
junctions and disjunctions were available, then it could be possible to employ
such connectives to produce appropriate technical surrogates of the tautologies
and inferences of Classical Logic which will be rendered as true or valid, in the
supplemented system. More concretely then, even if the classical tautologies are
not true (and the classical inferences are not valid) when formulated with the
help of ¬,∧ and ∨, perhaps they are when formulated with the help of other
connectives not constrained by the aforementioned principle.
The second of these assumptions is that valuations for all propositional vari-
ables range over the set containing the values t, f and n, that is to say, all
propositional variables available could, in principle, be either true, false, or
meaningless. In this case, the reasoning behind the claim that this induces
the aforementioned problems goes along the following lines. If distinguished
propositional variables were available—whose valuations did not range over the
elements t, f and n, but just over the first two—then it could be possible to
define validity only over formulae built using those distinguished propositional
variables, in order to retain all the tautologies and valid inferences of Classical
Logic. In other words, even if the classical tautologies are not true (and the clas-
sical inferences are not valid) when formulated over the full collection of propo-
sitional variables, perhaps they are when formulated over the rather restricted
set of distinguished propositional variables, which are always meaningful—for
they cannot receive the value n in any valuation.
In a nutshell, the core of these reflections is a coin that has two sides, one
constituted by a negative claim, the other by a positive claim. The negative
claim is that, as long as meaningless sentences can be around, the tautologies
and inferential principles of Classical Logic are invalid in significance logics.
The positive claim is that the tautologies and inferential principles of Classical
Logic are valid in significance logics, when restricted to meaningful sentences,
or when expressed with the help of suitable connectives (i.e., connectives not
obeying the Principle of Component Homogeneity).
Linguistic considerations along these lines were present in the literature re-
volving around significance logics from the very beginning. In fact, Bochvar
himself acknowledged the existence of two variants of logical connectives used
to express assertion, denial, negation, conjunction, disjunction, and so on: the
internal and the external connectives. The former operated following the Prin-
ciple of Component Homogeneity, whereas the latter did not. According to ev-
eryone involved in the conversation, paradigmatic examples of logical operations
of this last kind are, e.g., the predication of truth, falsity, meaninglessness and
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meaningfulness to any sentence whatsoever. This is all in line with Bochvar’s
reflection on the matter, e.g., in [2, p. 89] but also notably with others. For
example, in this regard Goddard says:
it is always significant to say of an absurd expression that it is ab-
surd; and if we restrict the application of the logic to indicatives, we
may say that an expression is absurd if and only if it is neither true
nor false. To say, then, of an absurd expression that it is not true
and not false is to make a significant, i.e., a two-valued, statement.
But if ‘not true and not false’ is a significant description, so are its
component parts ‘not true’ and ‘not false’. And again, if ‘not true’
is a significant description of an absurdity, so is ‘true’; and similarly,
so is ‘false’. So it is always significant, though false, to say of an
absurdity that it is true or that it is false [18, p. 147]
It should be noticed, though, that contrary to what is nowadays common
practice the truth and the falsity predicates were back then not properly un-
derstood as predicates that apply to quotation names for the target sentences,
but as truth and falsity operators that apply to the proposition expressed by
the target sentences. This being said, Bochvar claims the internal form of the
assertion of ϕ is represented by the formula ϕ itself, whereas the external form
of its assertion is represented by the expression ‘ϕ is true’, formalized by the
proposition Tϕ. Accordingly, the internal form of the conjunction and disjunc-
tion of sentences ϕ and ψ are represented by the formulae ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∨ ψ,
respectively. Meanwhile, their external form is expressed by the phrases ‘ϕ is
true and ψ is true’, and ϕ is true or ψ is true’, formalized by the propositions
ϕuψ and ϕtψ. These last two are, according to Bochvar, definable as Tϕ∧Tψ
and Tϕ ∨Tψ—in line with his remark that the “external forms (...) represent
nothing other than the corresponding internal forms, in which ϕ and ψ have
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Figure 2: Some external connectives
There is yet another couple of logical operations definable with the help
of these external notions, that Bochvar and the remaining scholars pay special
attention to. On the one hand, there is the predication of meaninglessness to any
sentence whatsoever which, following our previous clarifications, was treated by
7As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, it should be highlighted that the external
connectives were also introduced in Segerberg’s study of Halldén’s external logic, in [38].
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those involved in the discussion as an operator—instead of a proper predicate.
This sort of operation, represented by the expression ‘ϕ is meaningless’ and
formalized as ↓ϕ, can in fact be defined as ¬(Tϕ∨Fϕ). It is straightforward to
see, although he did not focus on it, that the related notion of meaningfulness
is of equal if not more interest—as witnessed by the discussion below. This
notion, formalizable as ↑ϕ, can be defined either as ¬↓ϕ or, more conspicuously,
as Tϕ ∨ Fϕ.
Bochvar’s own idea was that an external expression of the first kind, claiming
the meaningless nature of a sentence ϕ did not have any proper internal form
counterpart [2, p. 90]. Halldén, on the other hand, shared the opinion that it
was necessary to expand the language with connectives not obeying the Prin-
ciple of Component Homogeneity, but he believed that expressions such as ‘ϕ
is meaningful’ were ambiguous, i.e., that they had several meanings attached to
them [25, p. 36]. More particularly, concerning the concept of meaningfulness
he thought that it had a tight relation with the idea of a sentence being true
or false, although he objected that these notions had a recognizably different
range of application. He argues along the following lines:
In certain cases we can meaningfully assert [‘p is meaningful’], but
not [‘p is true or p is false], namely in those cases in which p is
meaningless. The concept of meaningfulness is such that it can be
meaningfully asserted of entities which are meaningless. But [the
concept of being true or false] cannot be meaningfully asserted of
such entities. Then, the concepts (...) are not identical [25, p. 38]
Although probably not all the scholars involved in the discussion would agree
with these remarks, from the point of view of Halldén this helped him advance
the claim that it is necessary to have different linguistic ways of expressing both
ideas, letting the former be formalized by a meaningful operator working like ↑
above.
As a matter of fact, not only Bochvar and Halldén thought that significance
logics needed to be further equipped with operators expressing the concept of
meaningfulness and meaninglessness, but also Goddard, Routley and Brady did.
As discussed in the previous section, they believed that significance logics were
motivated by considerations around Russell’s type-theory and Ryle’s philosophy
of language. In accordance with these reflections, there was the need to express
some of the ideas about these topics in a rather formal manner. This implies
that enough formal resources, i.e., logical connectives, have to be available so
as to formalize several principles of significance. Goddard and Routley point
out that Russell falls short of this task, failing to provide a proper formalization
of his ideas expressed in Principia Mathematica, because he has no means to
express in the symbolism of his system the conditions that, e.g., if a predicate
applied to an individual of certain type is significant, then it is also significant
as applied to another different individual of the same type [21, p. 225]. For
such tasks, connectives expressing the idea that propositions are meaningless or
meaningful are required.
13
A further logical connective behaving in the way just described above was
also discussed in the literature on significance logics, namely the so-called ex-
clusion negation. This notion is usually expressed by phrases like ‘ϕ is not true’
and formalized by the proposition ∼ϕ. Bochvar identified this as the external
variant of denial. Thus, while the internal form of the denial of ϕ is represented
by the formula ¬ϕ, its external form is represented by the expression ‘ϕ is not
true’. Whence, as discussed by Brady and Routley in [5, p. 219], this sort of
negation can be defined as ¬Tϕ.
Discussion of such a connective arose when some, like Haack, Lambert, and
Bradley opposed the view that there was a need for a three-valued account of
nonsignificant sentences claiming that these can be fairly well accommodated
in a two-valued contexts—e.g., in [22], [23], [27], and [4]. To this extent, mean-
ingless sentences like Carnap’s paradigmatic example ‘This stone is thinking
about Vienna’ would be rendered as (necessarily) false, in virtue of the fact
that their negative-style counterparts such as ‘This stone is not thinking about
Vienna’ appeared to some as less queer [20, p. 14]. But this certainly violates
the constraint according to which if a sentence is meaningless, so is its negation.
Thus, if meaningless sentences were to be necessarily false, so would be their
negations—which implies in itself a hugely revisionary account of the relation
between sentences and their negations.
Routley’s own way of explaining out this problem is clear enough. He says
that:
it might be thought that ‘Tables do not talk’ is significant, in fact
true, while ‘Tables talk’ is non-significant. Here, however, the ‘not’
in ‘Tables do not talk’ is taken to mean ‘cannot be significantly
said to’ and hence ‘Tables talk’ should be interpreted as ‘Tables
(can significantly be said to) talk’; in this case, both sentences are
significant [35, p. 200]
Following Goddard [17, p. 147], these sort of considerations allow for an indirect
definition of meaningfulness. For, on the one hand, meaningful sentences are
those sentence for which negating them in the usual manner and negating them
in the special way just described renders the same results. So, if negating a sen-
tence delivers the same result in an external or an internal way, then the sentence
is meaningful. Otherwise, if negating a sentence in the usual manner renders
one thing (i.e., a meaningless sentence) and negating them in the external way
renders another (i.e., a true sentence), then the sentence is meaningless.
This being said, let us now turn to a more formal account of our initial
remarks to the extent that classical tautologies and inferences could be retained
if linguistic measures were properly taken.
First, let LE be the expansion of the language L with the previously discussed
connectives T,F,u,t, ↓, ↑ and ∼, and let FOR(LE) be its set of well-formed
formulae, defined as usual. Similarly, let L↑ be the expansion of the language L
with the previously discussed connective ↑, and let FOR(L↑) be its set of well-
formed formulae, defined as usual. In this respect, it is useful to have in mind a
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terminology due to Krister Segerberg. In [37, 38] it is said that a propositional
variable p is open in a formula ϕ if and only if at least one occurrence of p in ϕ is
not in the scope of a connective of the external language. Thus, a propositional
variable p is covered in a formula ϕ if and only if it is not open in ϕ. It is easy
to observe that if a formula has all of its propositional variables covered, then
it is guaranteed to receive a classical truth-value—and thus can be considered
to represent a meaningful proposition.
Secondly, let WKE be the extension of the weak Kleene algebra WK with
the operations associated to the external connectives T,F,u,t, ↓, ↑ and ∼. Sim-
ilarly, let WK↑ be the extension of the weak Kleene algebra WK with the mean-
ingfulness operator associated to the connective ↑. Given this, let Bochvar’s ex-
ternal logic Σ be the system induced by the logical matrix 〈WKE, {t}〉, and
let Halldén’s external logic C be the system induced by the logical matrix
〈WK↑, {t,n}〉.
Furthermore, let V ar be the set of all propositional variables of the language,
let V ar(ϕ) be the set of all propositional variables occurring in ϕ, and for a set
of sentences Γ, let V ar(Γ) =
⋃
{V ar(γ) | γ ∈ Γ} be defined as usual. Finally, let
the ext-translation from FOR(L) to FOR(LE) be recursively defined as follows:
(p)ext = p
(¬ϕ)ext = ∼(ϕ)ext
(ϕ ∧ ψ)ext = (ϕ)ext u (ψ)ext
(ϕ ∨ ψ)ext = (ϕ)ext t (ψ)ext
Having these pieces in place helps appreciating the following observations
that can be easily proved as done, for example, in [2, pp. 95-96] and [12, pp.
96-97], respectively. Notice that tautologies or theorems can be considered as
limit cases of valid inferences of the form Γ  ϕ, where Γ = ∅.8 As highlighted
by an anonymous reviewer, it should be pointed out that in the observations
below the set V ar(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) is finite, because CL is a finitary logic.
Observation 3. All the tautologies and valid inferences of CL are valid in
Σ, if the usual logical connectives of negation, conjunction and disjunction are
replaced by their external forms, i.e., (Γ)ext Σ (ϕ)ext iff Γ CL ϕ.
Observation 4. All the tautologies and valid inferences of CL are valid in C,
if it is assumed that all the propositional variables involved are meaningful, i.e.,
if V ar(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) = {p1, . . . , pn}, ↑p1, . . . , ↑pn,Γ C ϕ iff Γ CL ϕ.
Notice that this last result says that all the inferences that are valid in CL
hold in the logic of nonsense C if and only if all the propositional variables
appearing in the formulae involved in the inference in question are assumed to
be meaningful. The emphasis in the assumption here is crucial to understand
the result. To use Segerberg’s terminology introduced above, the result does not
say that all the propositional variables appearing in the formula involved in the
8Therefore, if a logic L1 has the same valid inferences as the logic L2, then it has also the
same tautologies as L2.
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inference in question are as a matter of fact covered, and therefore meaningful.
Instead, the result considers what would follow if we were to assume that all
such propositional variables are meaningful—thus, treating this as a working
hypothesis rather than an established fact.9
To close this section, let us now consider another alternative of cashing out
these linguistic restrictions, due to Goddard and Routley. As we previously said,
these authors attribute the failure of the truth- and non-falsity-preservation
accounts in the context of significance logics to the implicit assumption that
valuations for all propositional variables range over the WK algebra. Enter-
taining the idea of abandoning this feature is represented, in terms of inferential
principles, by giving up substitution-invariance.
This property, usually taken as a defining feature of what a logic is, is actually
explicitly criticized by Goddard and Routley. It can be succinctly described in
the following way. Recall that an L-substitution is an endomorphism σ of the
formula-algebra FOR(L). Then, a logic L is substitution-invariant if and only if
for all Γ ⊆ FOR(L) and ϕ ∈ FOR(L) and all substitution functions σ, if Γ L ϕ,
then σ[Γ] L σ(ϕ). Thus, regarding substitution-invariance, these authors claim
that:
It needs only a few examples to show that whatever credence is given
to the rule of uniform substitution in ordinary logics should be with-
held when uniform substitutions of nonsignificant sentences in theses
is considered. Consider some examples: substituting in [p ⊃ p] we
obtain such nonsignificant sentences as ‘If the Absolute is green then
the Absolute is green’; ‘If quadruplicity drinks procrastination, then
it does’; and by substituting in [∀xFx ⊃ Fa], we have ‘If all numbers
like soup, then the number six likes soup.’ Hence, significance is not
preserved under uniform substitution. [21, p. 275]
Before moving on with some further observations by Goddard and Routley,
let us notice that in the previous quote the rejection of uniform substitution
or of substitution-invariance as a desirable property of a significance logic is
grounded in the fact that such a principle does not preserve significance.10 By
this it is meant that some inference whose premises and conclusion are signif-
icant can be turned into an inference whose premises and conclusion are not
significant, by means of substitution-invariance. To speak properly, this failure
9We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to clarify this.
10Notice that the discussion about substitution-invariance, as presented by some authors in
the literature, does not rely on the logics in question being first-order. In fact, like the quote
about highlights—even in propositional frameworks—substitution-invariance could lead to
transitions from significant or meaningful instances of a schema like p ⊃ p (such as ”If it
is sunny, then it is sunny”) to otherwise nonsignificant instances (such as the referred ”if
the Absolute is green, then the Absolute is green”). Admittedly, this may or may not be a
good reason to abandon substitution-invariance, but our aim is not to assess this matter. All
we wanted to do is reconstruct the discussion as it historically happened, for we think new
ideas and inspirations can arise from a close examination thereof. We would like to thank an
anonymous review for urging us to clarify this issue.
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is witnessed at some sort of meta level, where some property of an inference
is not preserved while transitioning to another inference. Thus, significance-
preservation appears to be cherished by these authors as a sort of desideratum
governing transitions from inferences to inferences—in nowadays terminology, a
‘metainferential’ principle.
Interestingly, although discussed and motivated only at a meta level, God-
dard and Routley’s rejection of this principle might point towards a further
option for the ground level—not entertained by them or by any other party
in the literature on significance logics—that we briefly stop to analyze here.
This alternative is nothing other that the conjunction of truth-preservation and
significance-preservation, i.e., the idea according to which not only truth has
to be preserved from premises to conclusion, but also significance has to. This
option implies the rejection of non-falsity-preservation, but it does not con-
done the mere adoption of truth-preservation as an alternative. For, on the
one hand, non-falsity-preservation allows to transition from true (hence, signif-
icant) premises to nonsignificant conclusions. But, on the other hand, truth-
preservation accepts as appropriate cases where significance is not preserved, i.e.,
in the case of inferences with false (hence significant) premises and nonsignifi-
cant conclusions. Interestingly, inferences of this kind were considered as harm-
less both by the truth-preservation account and the non-falsity-preservation
account. Therefore, asking for significance-preservation renders a notion of log-
ical consequence for significance logics that is considerably stricter than truth-
preservation, as one would expect. To wit, under truth-preservation the Prin-
ciple of Explosion or Ex Contradictione Quodlibet—i.e., the inference ϕ,¬ϕ 
ψ—is valid (since premises cannot possibly be true), but under significance-
preservation this is invalid (since premises can be false, while the conclusion
is nonsignificant). To close these exploratory remarks, let us highlight that
adopting truth- and significance-preservation does not imply the rejection of
substitution-invariance, as can be easily checked.11
Goddard and Routley, however, advocate for the abandonment of substitution-
invariance and propose to formally model their choice along the following lines:
[T]he semantical equivalent of restricted substitution (...) is re-
stricted assignments of values to the sentential variables, and the
particular restriction suggested amounts to specifying that certain
variables should vary only over the set {t, f} and not the full set
{t, f ,n} [21, p. 275]
Let us, then, consider the simplest of Goddard and Routley’s systems con-
structed following this recommendations, the logic S0. Before going into the
details, we should bear in mind that the terminology and techniques used by
the authors to construct their system do not perfectly align with the distinc-
tions and standards implemented nowadays—for instance in Abstract Algebraic
11For more on significance-preservation in the context of three-valued logics, see [6, p. 2198].
For an application of significance- preservation to the definition of containment logics, see [30].
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Logic. This, however, does not deprive this system of historical interest, which
is why we chose to present it here, nevertheless.
This being said, let V ar be the set of all propositional variables of the system,
and let V ar∗ be a copy of it, where for every p ∈ V ar, we have a p∗ ∈ V ar∗.
The set of well-formed formulae built using variables either in V ar or in V ar∗
is called FOR(L) as before, whereas the set of well-formed formulae built using
only propositional variables in V ar∗ can be called FOR(L∗). Valuations for
S0 map every member of V ar to a truth-value in {t, f ,n}, but they map every
member of V ar∗ to a truth-value in the restricted set {t, f}—in both cases,
according to the weak Kleene truth-tables.
Thus, by an easy induction we can see that the formulae in FOR(L∗) (built
using only the propositional variables in V ar∗) are going to be two-valued and,
hence, meaningful too. This induces a division between the unrestricted and
possibly meaningless sentences, and the restricted and forcefully meaningful
sentences. In this spirit, logical consequence for S0 is defined only for sets of
such restricted or distinguished formulae. Validity, as a technical notion, is not
defined for formulae belonging to FOR(L), in general. This allows the said
authors to prove the following fact in [21, p. 303].12
Observation 5. All the tautologies and valid inferences of CL are valid in S0,
if it is assumed that all the propositional variables involved are meaningful, i.e.,
Γ S0 ϕ iff Γ CL ϕ.
However—as advertised by Goddard and Routley—substitution-invariance
is invalid in their system. Nevertheless, being it a constitutive feature of what a
logical system is, it would be a nice thing to retain, if possible, along with all the
tautologies and valid inferences of Classical Logic. Having a proper significance
logic that enjoys all of these advantages at the same time has proven an elusive
task, but in the next section we will show how it can be achieved. We not
only do this, but at the same time show how embracing such a novel framework
allows for the dissolution of the previously discussed divisions, which then prove
to be unnecessary.
12Although these authors did not present their system using the terminology of Abstract
Algebraic Logic, we could perhaps partially reconstruct their ideas in the following way. S0
valuations are homomorphisms between FOR(L) and WK such that they are also homo-
morphisms between FOR(L∗) and the 2-element Boolean algebra. Furthermore, and perhaps
here is where the biggest divergence with the contemporary terminology becomes apparent,
these authors somehow took S0 to be “defined” in some sense over FOR(L∗) but also perhaps
in some sense over FOR(L). In this vein, the result of Observation 5 can be read as saying
that whenever Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FOR(L∗), Γ S0 ϕ iff Γ CL ϕ. Given the fact that if any of the
formulae involved is substituted by a formula with a propositional variable not in V ar∗, then
some inferences become invalid, these authors take it that substitution-invariance is not valid




In this section we present a significance logic which enjoys all the desired features
highlighted in the paragraphs above, without suffering any of the shortcomings
of the previously discussed systems. Not only that, but we will also claim that
adopting our favored logic allows to dissolve the need for the divisions that were
subject to comment in earlier sections. To this extent, in this section we aim to
establish three main results.
The first—and perhaps the main—result consists in showing that the set
of inferences valid in the significance logic that we put forward here coincides
with the set of those inferences that are valid in Classical Logic. Furthermore,
since tautologies can be seen as inferences with empty set of premises, it is
also the case that the set of tautologies of the significance logic that we favor
coincides with the set of tautologies of Classical Logic. Whence, we claim, there
are enough reasons to refer to the significance logic that we defended here as a
classical logic of nonsense.
The second result consists in showing that within our significance logic the
divide between truth-preservation and non-falsity-preservation can be dissolved.
In other words, in what pertains to logical consequence, embracing our approach
to non-significance makes it unnecessary to choose between truth-preservation
and non-falsity-preservation, because—in some qualified sense—both are repre-
sented in our definition of logical entailment.
The third result consists in showing that within our approach the need for
introducing any linguistic restrictions effectively disappears. The reasons for
this are twofold. On the one hand, adopting our approach makes it unnecessary
to choose between the internal and external connectives, since the inferences
valid involving either of them will be the same—modulo translation. On the
other hand, it also makes it unnecessary to divide the propositional variables
between those that are meaningful and those which can be meaningless, because
the set of valid inferences involving variables of each of these sorts will be the
same—namely, those valid in Classical Logic.
Let us explain in simple terms, then, how we will understand validity moving
forward. In a nutshell, for an inference to be valid in our framework it will be
required that there is no valuation complying with the weak Kleene truth-tables
which makes all the premises true (or assigns all the premises the value t) while
at the same time making the conclusion false (or assigning the conclusion the
value f). These sort of requirements were motivated by Cobreros, Egré, Ripley
and van Rooij in the following way, where the truth-values t, f , and n are
identified with 1, 0, and 12 , respectively:
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13Recall that these authors identify t with 1, f with 0, and n with 1
2
. Thus, ‘having value
greater than 0’ should be understood in reference to the usual order of the rational numbers—
i.e., of having value either 1 or 1
2
, that is to say, either t or n. Notice that in the strong Kleene
case this order coincides with the order induced by the operations ∧ and ∨. As an anonymous
reviewer points out, this is not true of the weak Kleene case, where these operations induce
two different orders in none of which 1
2
is intermediate between 1 and 0—for more on this see,
e.g., [29].
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A “good” premise (a premise good enough to produce a sound argu-
ment) is one that takes value 1. A “good” conclusion, on the other
hand (a conclusion that is not false enough to produce a counterex-
ample) is one that takes value greater than 0.[10, p. 79]
Thus, an inference having a good premise (or set of good premises) and a bad
conclusion is an invalid inference. Notice that, in this sense, all it takes for
an inference to be invalid is to be invalid in Classical Logic, that is, to have
true premises and a false conclusion—something we will come back to a few
paragraphs below. Given validity and invalidity are mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive, if an inference is not invalid, it is valid. Therefore, all the
remaining cases where the premises are not true while at the same time the
conclusion is false, are not counterexamples of the inference in question.
These authors, however, were busy defining a satisfying notion of logical
consequence for frameworks employing another three-valued valuation schema—
the strong Kleene truth-tables. The logic stemming out of applying the previous
definition to said valuation schema is called ST in the context of several of their
works.14 Whence, given our proposed significance logic will implement their
approach to entailment to the weak Kleene truth-tables, we will refer to it as
weak ST (wST, for short).
In their work, these scholars highlight the impossibility to understand this
approach to logical consequence in terms of mere or plain preservation of some
semantic status (or formally speaking, of some set of designated values). A
technical upshot of this is the impossibility of representing wST using regular
logical matrices. However, some interesting algebraic constructions called p-
matrices can be used to represent entailment in our significance logic. These
constructions designed by Szymon Frankowski in [15] and later studied, among
others, by Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing in [39], generalize regular
logical matrices (meaning by that that the latter are special cases of the former).
As conceived by Frankowski, p-matrices are triples 〈A, D1, D∗〉 where A
is an algebra, and D1, D∗ are distinguished subsets of A (the universe of the
algebra) such that ∅ 6= D1 ⊆ D∗. As with regular logical matrices, the elements
of the algebra in question are usually referred to as ‘truth-values’, while its
operations are commonly represented in the form of the so-called ‘truth-tables’.
Valuations, again, refer to homomorphism from FOR(L) to A. Finally, a p-
matrix M = 〈A, D1, D∗〉 induces a p-consequence relation M as follows, where
Γ ⊆ FOR(L) and ϕ ∈ FOR(L):
Γ M ϕ⇐⇒ for every valuation v: if v[Γ] ⊆ D1, then v(ϕ) ∈ D∗
Thus, p-matrices generalize regular logical matrices, because when D1 = D∗
the corresponding p-matrix is a regular matrix. Additionally, notice that if by
14Although the collaboration between these scholars is always producing new material, a
to-this-day updated enumeration of their joint production revolving around ST must include
[9], [8], [10], and [11], together with David Ripley’s works [33] and [34].
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D∗ we refer to the complement of D∗ relative to A (i.e., A \D∗) the previous
definition can be rephrased as follows:
Γ M ϕ⇐⇒ for every valuation v: if v[Γ] ⊆ D1, then v(ϕ) /∈ D∗
This being said, our proposed logic to deal with nonsensical sentences can
be seen as induced by a very simple p-matrix. Indeed, as is easy to corrob-
orate, the logic wST can be understood as being induced by the p-matrix
〈WK, {t}, {t,n}〉, built on top of the weak Kleene algebra. Instantiating this
last reformulation of the general definition, thus, gives us the following reading
of logical consequence in wST—which appropriately formalizes the remarks and
motivation present in the quote from Cobreros and his collaborators, appearing
above:15
Γ wST ϕ⇐⇒ for every WK-valuation v: if v[Γ] = {t}, then v(ϕ) /∈ {f}
Now, having defined what logical consequence amounts to in wST, let us pro-
ceed to show the first result of this section. That is, how our significance logic
overcomes the difficulties suffered by the previously discussed accounts, allowing
to refer to it as a classical logic of nonsense. For this purpose, let us remember
that the significance logic embodying truth-preservation (Kw3 , that is) lacked
tautologies, thus suffering the absence of all the tautologies of Classical Logic.
On the other hand, the significance logic embodying non-falsity-preservation
(PWK, that is) shared the tautologies of Classical Logic, but lacked some infer-
ential principles dear to Classical Logic. Contrary to these limited frameworks,
our favored logic wST not only has the same tautologies that Classical Logic,
but also (as hinted by our previous remarks on its definition of logical con-
sequence) has the same valid inferences that Classical Logic—as the following
proof establishes.
Theorem 6. The logic wST has the same valid inferences that CL, i.e., Γ wST
ϕ iff Γ CL ϕ.
Proof. For the first equivalence, to prove the left to right direction, assume
Γ 2CL ϕ. Then, there is a Boolean valuation v such that v[Γ] = {t} and
v(ϕ) = f . But this trivially implies that there is a WK-valuation v∗ such that
v∗[Γ] = {t} and yet v∗(ϕ) = f , whence Γ 2wST ϕ. To prove the right to
left direction, assume Γ 2wST ϕ. Then, there is a WK-valuation v such that
v[Γ] = {t} and yet v(ϕ) = f . By the Principle of Component Homogeneity, we
know not only that there is no propositional variable p in all of the ψ ∈ Γ such
15Whereas instantiating the first formulation of the general definition for p-matrices gives
us this alternative reading of logical consequence in wST:
Γ wST ϕ⇐⇒ for every WK-valuation v: if v[Γ] = {t}, then v(ϕ) ∈ {t,n}
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that v(p) = n, but also that there is no propositional variable q in ϕ such that
v(q) = n. Hence, we are guaranteed that v is a Boolean valuation. Thus, we
know that there is a Boolean valuation v∗, which is exactly like v, such that
v∗[Γ] = {t} and yet v∗(ϕ) = f , whence Γ 2CL ϕ.
Observation 7. The logic wST has the same tautologies that CL, i.e., wST ϕ
iff CL ϕ.
Proof. Recall that, in the context of a logic defined by a p-matrix 〈A, D1, D∗〉,
for ϕ to be a tautology means that for every valuation v, v(ϕ) ∈ D∗. In the
case of wST this means that for every valuation v, v(ϕ) ∈ {t,n}. It is easy to
see that wST and CL share their tautologies by applying these considerations
and assuming that Γ = ∅ in the proof of Theorem 6 above.
As an anonymous reviewer highlights, the previous results show that there
are ways of arriving at Classical Logic using p-matrices, instead of using the
usual matrix-based semantics. But this is not the only advantage of our ac-
count. Our favorite significance logic has also an important saying in the truth-
preservation versus non-falsity-preservation debate. In fact, the second result of
this section consists in showing that embracing wST contributes to the dissolu-
tion of the truth versus non-falsity divide. We will establish this by reflecting
upon the fact—noted, e.g., in [6, 2194, fn. 1]—that the definition of entail-
ment that we are embracing can be paraphrased in a deeply illuminating and
equivalent manner, as follows:
Γ wST ϕ⇐⇒ for every WK-valuation v :
{
if v[Γ ∪ {ϕ}] ⊆ {t, f}, then
(if v[Γ] = {t}, then v(ϕ) ∈ {t})
In order to make our point, let us notice that being assigned a value in {t, f}
by a valuation v amounts to being meaningful or significant in the context of v.
With this in mind, let us notice that the alternative definition of validity in wST
that we just detailed makes it is reasonable to assert that logical consequence
can be read in two equally satisfying manners within our significance logic.
On the one hand, it can be understood as requiring that if the premises
and the conclusion are meaningful, then if the premises are true, the conclusion
must also be true. This means that truth-preservation is the standard of wST
validity—conditional on both premises and conclusion being meaningful. On
the other hand, it can be understood as requiring that if the premises and the
conclusion are meaningful, then if the premises are not false, the conclusion must
also be not false. This means that non-falsity-preservation is also the standard
of wST validity—granted both premises and conclusion are meaningful. This
is the case, precisely, because truth and non-falsity coincide when meaningful-
ness is assumed. That is to say, conditional on the premises and conclusion
being meaningful, truth- and non-falsity-preservation render the same results.
Whence, given the definition of logical consequence in the context of wST can
be presented in this conditional way—as above—both criteria are represented
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in a qualified sense within our definition of entailment. Therefore, we claim,
embracing our logic makes it unnecessary to choose between these options.16
Before going any further, we should stop to notice that the previous refor-
mulation of the definition of wST consequence ties it to another significance
logic that we discussed earlier—Goddard and Routley’s S0. Recall that such a
logic was defined so that inferences were valid only if truth was preserved from
premises to conclusion—only when premises and conclusions were guaranteed
to be meaningful. This meant, in Goddard and Routley’s cases, that this mean-
ingfulness condition had to be respected. In other words, when either premises
or conclusions were non-significant, validity was not properly defined. This is
not to say that the validity judgment had a non-standard status, but validity
was only defined for the fragment of the language for which it was guaranteed
that sentences were always meaningful. As a result of such restrictions, the rule
of substitution-invariance was deemed invalid. In contradistinction with God-
dard and Routley’s approach, ours does not fall prey of such inconveniences. In
fact, wST validates substitution-invariance—as most people working with logi-
cal systems would like to do—without precluding the assessment of inferences
with either meaningless premises or meaningless conclusions. This is possible,
precisely, because we do not require that premises and conclusions are meaning-
ful in order to evaluate the validity of the corresponding inference, but instead
we evaluate the validity of the corresponding inferences conditional on premises
and conclusions being meaningful. This need not be proved especially for the
case of our logic, since it holds for all the systems induced by p-matrices—as
proved in [16, Section 2], and as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer.
Moving forward, our third result of this section amounts to showing that
within wST the linguistic divides referred in the previous sections can be dis-
solved. By these we mean, first, the dispute over the internal and the external
logical vocabulary (due to Bochvar and Halldén) and, second, the division be-
tween the sentences built using only meaningful propositional variables and
sentences built using unrestricted propositional variables (due to Goddard and
Routley).
Regarding the former, we can happily show that working with wST the lin-
guistic divide pertaining the internal versus external connectives debate can be
straightforwardly dissolved. More concretely, by this we mean that the same in-
ferences are valid in our significance logic, no matter which connectives are used
to represent the logical notions. That is to say, without detriment to whether
negation is expressed by the ¬ or the ∼ connective, or whether conjunction is
expressed by the ∧ or the u connective, or whether disjunction is expressed by
the ∨ or the t connective. Similarly, without detriment of whether or not it is
16An anonymous reviewer inquires into the way in which this qualified property of truth-
preservation, conditional on the premises and the conclusion being meaningful, is related to
validity in Kw3 and PWK. To this extent, it should be said that when an inference is valid in any
of these systems, then that inference enjoys the property in question. However, an inference
enjoying this property is not sufficient for it to be valid in either Kw3 or PWK. To wit, consider
the inference schemata ψ  ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ and ϕ,¬ϕ  ψ, both of which preserve truth under the
assumption that the formulae involved are meaningful, although the former is invalid in Kw3
and the latter is invalid in PWK.
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assumed that all the propositional variables p1, . . . , p2 involved in the inference
are meaningful, in the form of ↑p1, . . . , ↑pn.17
To give a rather formal expression to these ideas, consider the expansion
of wST with all the external connectives ∼,u,t, ↑, etc. discussed in earlier
sections, and let the resulting system be called wSTE. Then, our claims can be
formalized as follows.
Theorem 8. (Γ)ext wSTE (ϕ)
ext iff Γ wST ϕ.
Proof. First, we notice that (Γ)ext wSTE (ϕ)
ext iff (Γ)ext Σ (ϕ)ext. This can
be established by noticing that wSTE and Σ valuations are the same, and that
although their definition of logical consequence is different, the only kind of
WK-valuations that are Σ counterexamples but not wSTE counterexamples are
those where v[(Γ)ext] = {t} and v((ϕ)ext) = n. However, by its very construction
we know v((ϕ)ext) ∈ {t, f} and, thus, it is impossible to have these kind of coun-
terexamples. Whence, the equivalence. Secondly, we recall from Observation 3
that (Γ)ext Σ (ϕ)ext iff Γ CL ϕ. Thirdly, that Γ CL ϕ iff Γ wST ϕ. Finally, by
chaining these equivalences, we arrive at the desired result.
Theorem 9. If V ar(Γ∪{ϕ}) = {p1, . . . , pn}, ↑p1, . . . , ↑pn,Γ wSTE ϕ iff Γ wST
ϕ.
Proof. Similarly to the previous proof, we first notice that ↑p1, . . . , ↑pn,Γ wSTE
ϕ iff ↑p1, . . . , ↑pn,Γ C ϕ. This can be established by noticing that wSTE and C
valuations are the same, and that although their definition of logical consequence
is different, the only kind of WK-valuations that are C counterexamples but not
wSTE counterexamples are those where v[Γ∪{↑p1, . . . , ↑pn}] = {n} and v(ϕ) =
f . However, by its very construction we know v[Γ ∪ {↑p1, . . . , ↑pn}] ⊆ {t, f}
and, thus, it is impossible to have these kind of counterexamples. Whence, the
equivalence. Secondly, we recall from Observation 4 that ↑p1, . . . , ↑pn,Γ C ϕ
iff Γ CL ϕ. Thirdly, that Γ CL ϕ iff Γ wST ϕ. Finally, by chaining these
equivalences, we arrive at the desired result.
Now, we may also prove something similar regarding the division between
sentences built using unrestricted and possibly meaningless propositional vari-
ables, and sentences built using restricted and forcefully meaningful proposi-
tional variables. In the context of the framework that we defend, this distinction
is ineffective, as it induces no perceptible differences from a logical or inferential
point of view. This implies that the same set of valid inferences will be valid
within wST regardless of whether the involved sentences are part of the corseted
language or not.
Once more, to have a more concrete taste of what this amounts to, consider
the division of propositional variables discussed earlier in §3. Thus, FOR(L)
is the set of well-formed formulae built using propositional variables in the sets
17In this regard, as with Observation 4 above, recall that this result says that all CL-valid
inferences hold in wST if and only if all the propositional variables appearing in the formulae
involved in the inference in question are assumed to be meaningful—taking this assumption
as a working hypothesis, rather than an established a fact.
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V ar or V ar∗, while FOR(L∗) is the set of well-formed formulae built using
only propositional variables in the set V ar∗. Valuations over FOR(L) are weak
Kleene valuations, whereas valuations over FOR(L∗) are Boolean. Let us refer
to the logic induced by the last collection of valuations as wST∗. Then, our
claim can be formalized as follows.
Theorem 10. All the tautologies and valid inferences of CL are valid in wST
regardless of whether all the propositional variables involved are meaningful, i.e.,
Γ wST ϕ iff Γ wST∗ ϕ.
Proof. We first notice that it immediately follows from the definitions that
Γ wST∗ ϕ iff Γ S0 ϕ. For, when only Boolean valuations are around, defining
logical consequence as truth-preservation or as the absence of a valuation that
makes all the premises true but the conclusion false, is equivalent. Then, it all
follows from the same kind of reasoning of the previous proofs. We know from
Observation 5 that Γ S0 ϕ iff Γ CL ϕ, and we know that Γ CL ϕ iff Γ wST ϕ.
Whence, the emergence of the desired result.
Our claim, then, is that these three results (the fact that wST shares all
of Classical Logic’s valid inferences and tautologies without losing substitution-
invariance, the fact that wST represents both truth- and non-falsity-preservation,
and the fact that wST dissolves the internal versus external connectives divide,
along with the need for any linguistic restrictions) make a strong case for our
system to be a better significance logic than its contenders. Indeed, we see lit-
tle room for improvement in what pertains to the logical properties of an ideal
significance logic. Be that as it may, we believe to have accomplished what we
aimed for: presenting a new logic where the divisions arising from the disputes
appearing in the relevant literature were either overcome or dissolved, giving
place to a better and more encompassing framework.
5 Conclusions
Between the mid 60s and the late 70s a series of articles (published mostly in
the Australasian Journal of Philosophy) debated the legitimacy of even having a
significance logic—that is, a logical framework capable of handling nonsensical
though grammatical sentences. Among those who were for this project, there
was no simple agreement concerning the way in which some of the technicalities
should be handled. Some of the problems seemed to concern how to define
logical consequence (either as truth-preservation or as non-falsity-preservation),
and whether or not certain linguistic restrictions should be considered (either
in the form of some external connectives, or in the form of some restricted
propositional variables). At the time, these choices were perceived to be forced
upon those scholars who wanted to work with significance logics behaving as
similar to Classical Logic as possible. However, each of the alternatives had its
shortcomings and none was ultimately satisfactory. In this article we presented
what we take to be an overcoming proposal which has the same valid inferences
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and the same tautologies than Classical Logic, enjoys substitution-invariance,
and within which the need for the aforementioned divisions is dissolved.
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